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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Samuel Barnes was charged with burglary and petit theft, and exercised his right 
to a jury trial. He was convicted of both offenses and was sentenced to concurrent 
sentences of six years, with two years fixed, for his conviction of burglary and 120 days 
for his conviction of petit theft. The district court retained jurisdiction, but subsequently 
relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Barnes' original sentences. Mr. Barnes 
thereafter filed a motion for a reduction of his burglary sentence pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). The district court denied this motion. 
Mr. Barnes timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and raises three 
issues on appeal: whether the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
testimony from several witnesses identifying the figure in a surveillance video as 
Mr. Barnes; whether the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited testimony 
about a witness' opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt or innocence and of his character; and 
whether the district court abused its discretion when it permitted hearsay evidence from 
a witness despite an objection by Mr. Barnes. Additionally, Mr. Barnes asserts that, 
even if these errors are deemed harmless when taken in isolation, the cumulative effect 
of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
In the early morning hours of July 17, 2006, an individual entered a Subway 
restaurant while the store was closed. (Vol.1 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-13, p.58, Ls.4-24.) There 
were six video cameras operating within the Subway restaurant that captured this 
individual's entry and subsequent actions within the store. (Vol.1 Tr., p.24, Ls.6-8.) The 
digital recording of the security tapes and several still images from that recording were 
admitted into evidence and provided to the jury during deliberations. (Vol.1 Tr., p.55, 
L.24 - p.56, L.12, p.59, L.25 - p.63, L.l; R., p.81.) While the individual was wearing a 
mask and a glove on his right hand, he did not pull down the mask to obscure his face 
until after the man had entered the security code into a key pad by the back door of the 
Subway and a view of his face was captured on the security video. (Vol.1 Tr., p.194, 
Ls.19-23; State's Exhibits 2-9.) According to store records, approximately $648 dollars 
was taken from the safe as a result of the theft that morning. (Vol.1 Tr., p.137, L.2 - 
p.138, L.6.) 
There were a limited number of people who were given keys to the back door of 
the restaurant, the security codes for the alarm at the back door and for the lower safe 
where the money was taken. (Vol.1 Tr., p.64, Ls.9-12, p.100, Ls.1-4, p.143, Ls.9-17.) 
However, there was uncontroverted testimony that the turnover rate was very high at 
this restaurant, and that the codes had not been changed in at least one year. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.lO1, L.17-p.102, L.25, p.142, Ls.2-11, p.143, Ls.18-24.) 
Law enforcement showed the security tapes or still images of the security tapes 
to several individuals. (Vol.1 Tr., p.113, Ls.22-23, p.121, L.8 - p.124, L.14, p.173, 
Ls.11-20, p.213, Ls.15-21.) Many of them identified Mr. Barnes as the individual 
captured by the security cameras. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.114, L.8 - p.115, L.18, p.126, Ls.18-22, 
p.173, Ls.11-20, p.213, Ls.15-21.) At the time of the theft, Mr. Barnes was dating s.K.', 
' S.K. was a juvenile at the time of the theft and Mr. Barnes' trial. As such, she will not 
be named herein, but will be referred to instead by her initials. 
an employee at the Subway; and Mr. Barnes visited her at the restaurant regularly while 
she was working. (Vol. I Tr., p.106, L.7 - p.107, L. 18.) Mr. Barnes was charged with 
burglary and petit theft, and exercised his right to a jury trial. (See Vol.1 ~r. ' ,  generally; 
R., pp.14-15.) 
Prior to opening statements, Mr. Barnes objected to the State presenting any 
testimony of witnesses who were not present at the time of the theft regarding 
identification of the individual pictured on the security tapes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.3, L.16 - p.5, 
L.19.) This objection was based on I.R.E. 701, and Mr. Barnes asserted that this 
testimony was not relevant because it would not assist the trier of fact in determination 
of a fact at issue. (Vol.1 Tr., p.3, L.16 - p.5, L.19.) The district court overruled 
Mr. Barnes' objection and permitted the State to introduce opinion testimony by lay 
witnesses as to the identity of the person on the security tapes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.5, Ls.13- 
19.) During opening statements, the State informed the jury that it would hear testimony 
from several witnesses identifying Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted on the security 
tapes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.18, L.21 -p.19, L.19.) 
After the State's first witness, Mr. Barnes renewed his objection to permitting any 
lay testimony identifying the individual on the security tape as Mr. Barnes. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.73, L.8 - p.76, L.14.) Mr. Barnes directed the district court to case law holding 
* Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings, for ease of 
reference, citations to the transcript are made herein with reference to the volume 
number of the transcript. Volume 1 of the transcripts of proceedings contains the 
transcript of the jury trial occurring January 22-23, 2007 and the transcript of the rider 
review hearing that took place on July 25, 2007. Volume 2 of the transcripts of 
proceedings contains the sentencing hearing that took place on March 1, 2007. Finally, 
Volume 3 of the transcripts of proceedings contains the rider review hearing that was 
held on June 27,2007. 
that identification of an individual depicted on videotape evidence is a question of fact 
for the jury. (Vol.1 Tr., p.73, L.8 - p.74, L.25.) The district court again overruled 
Mr. Barnes' objections, but remained open to revisiting the issue and stated that, "If I 
feel that I am horribly wrong I might grant you a mistrial, but we will see where we are 
on that, Counsel." (Vol.1 Tr., p.76, L.15 - p.78, L.18.) 
The State presented the testimony of Sherilyn Bell, an employee of the Subway 
where the theft occurred. (Vol.1 Tr., p.92, Ls.8-19.) She was the employee who first 
opened the store after the theft. (VoI.1 Tr., p.93, L.22 - p.94, L.13.) Once she noticed 
that money was missing from the bottom safe where the cash register tills were stored, 
Ms. Bell contacted her supervisor who, in turn, contacted the police. (Vol.1 Tr., p.94, 
L . l l  - p.96, L.17.) Later on the morning of the theft, Ms. Bell was shown the security 
tape and was also shown the tape again at trial. (Vol.1 Tr., p.97, L.15 - p.98, L.14.) 
Ms. Bell could not identify the individual captured on the security video. (Vol.1 Tr., p.8, 
L s l - 1 4 .  She testified that at least four people were authorized to keep keys to the 
Subway at any given time, and that there was nothing precluding someone with 
possession of this key from making a copy for themselves. (VoI.1 Tr., p.100, Ls.1-6.) 
John Cowie, the restaurant manager immediately prior to the time of the theft, 
was next called to the stand. (Vol.1 Tr., p.104, Ls.17-22.) Mr. Cowie sometimes 
worked with S.K., and observed Mr. Barnes visiting her during her shifts. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.106, L.7 - p.107, L.18.) Mr. Barnes would stay for one-half hour to an hour at the 
beginning of these shifts. (Vol.1 Tr., p.107, Ls.1-7.) However, S.K. had only worked at 
Subway for approximately two months, and only worked three or four shifts each week. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.116, Ls.11-18.) 
Mr. Cowie trained S.K. on how to close the store, and in the process provided her 
with access codes to the safe and the security code for the back door. (Vol.1 Tr., p.107, 
L.19 - p.108 L. l l . )  He further testified that a key that opened all of the doors to the 
restaurant went missing a few days before the robbery while S.K. was working. (Vol.1 
I Tr., p.llO, L.4-p.112, L.20.) 
Mr. Cowie was called in to Subway on the morning the theft was discovered. 
I 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.112, L.24 - p.113, L.8.) He was shown the security video of the theft. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.113, Ls.22-23.) As with Ms. Bell, Mr. Barnes was also shown the video 
while testifying at trial. (Vol.1 Tr., p.114, Ls.3-7.) He identified the person in the 
I 
security video to police as "S.K.'s boyfriend," and subsequently identified the figure on 
I the tape as Mr. Barnes at trial. (Vol. 1 Tr., p. 114, L.8 - p.115, L.18.) 
Rachelte Orand was an assistant manager at Subway, and also was shown the 
security video on the morning of the robbery and at trial. (Vol.1 Tr., p.121, L.8 - p.124, 
I 
L.14.) As with Mr. Cowie, Ms. Orand testified that she had seen Mr. Barnes come into 
the Subway at the beginning of S.K.'s shifts. (VoI.1 Tr., p.124, L.22 - p.126, L.17.) She 
also testified that the person captured on the security video was Mr. Barnes. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.126, Ls.18-22.) Ms. Orand told police the morning of the theft that the person in 
the video was "one of the employee's boyfriends." (Vol.1 Tr., p.127, Ls.12-18.) She 
noted that Mr. Barnes "[l]ooks like he lost weight," and that he had "a different haircut." 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.127, L.22 - p.128, L.2) Ms. Orand confirmed that a copy of the key to the 
I 
Subway restaurant had gone missing during one of S.K.'s shifts. (Vol.1 Tr., p.122, L.5 - 
p.123, L.13.) 
Following this testimony, Mr. Barnes renewed his objection a third time regarding 
the presentation of testimony from lay witnesses identifying the person on the security 
tapes because they were available to the jury for their own review. (VoI.1 Tr., p.152, 
L.15 - p.154, L.8.) Mr. Barnes provided the district court with additional case law that 
addressed the issue of whether such identification testimony could properly be given to 
identify persons depicted on videotape. (Vol.1 Tr., p.152, Ls.38-23.) The district court 
found the identification evidence was relevant and admissible because Ms. Orand 
stated that Mr. Barnes looked like he lost weight and had made an unidentified change 
to his hairstyle. (Vol.1 Tr., p.158, Ls.3-9.) As such, the district court denied Mr. Barnes' 
request to strike the testimony identifying him as the person on the security tape. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.158, Ls.10-14.) 
Mr. Barnes then asked the district court to restrict the presentation of any further 
witnesses on the basis that any further testimony would be cumulative. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.159, Ls.17-24.) The State expressed that it intended to present further testimony 
regarding the identity of the person on the tape through the testimony of law 
enforcement officers. (Vol.1 Tr., p.159, L.25 - p.160, L.6.) There were no other 
witnesses that the State indicated that it would call regarding the identity of the person 
on the security video. (Vo.1 Tr., p.159, L.25 - p.160, L.6.) The district court ruled that 
the testimony of law enforcement officers as to their opinion of the identity of the person 
captured on the tape would constitute bolstering, and that these officers could not testify 
as to an identification of the person on the tape based upon their expertise and training. 
(Vo1.l Tr., p.161, L.19-p.164, L. l l . )  
Despite Mr. Barnes' objection to any further witnesses as being cumulative, the 
State proceeded to call two other witnesses that testified as to their lay opinion 
regarding whether Mr. Barnes was the individual depicted on the videotape. The State 
first called Tabitha Clausen, who was working with S.K. on the night that the key to the 
Subway store went missing. (Vol.1 Tr., p.167, L.10 - p.168, L.23.) She also gave S.K. 
the codes for the alarm system because S.K. was supposed to be the designated closer 
after Ms. Clausen ceased to work at the restaurant. (Vol.1 Tr., p.169, Ls.3-15.) 
As with the other Subway employees, Ms. Ciausen stated that she had seen 
Mr. Barnes come in to the store to visit S.K. (Vol.1 Tr., p.170, L.17 - p.171, L.21.) 
Ms. Clausen stated that she had looked at a still image from the security video and 
identified the person depicted as Mr. Barnes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.173, Ls.11-20.) 
S.K.'s father, George Keenworthy, was also called to the stand by the State. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.209, Ls.7-24.) He testified that he had known Mr. Barnes for approximately 
eight months, and that Mr. Barnes had lived with him and S.K. for a time. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.209, L.23 - p.210, L.15.) The State then began questioning Mr. Keenworthy 
about his statements made to law enforcement officers when they questioned him about 
the theft and about Mr. Barnes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.210, L.19 - p.214, L.l l.) Mr. Barnes 
objected to this line of questioning as hearsay, but the district court overruled this 
objection and concluded that these out-of-court statements were not hearsay. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.211, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Keenworthy testified that he had identified Mr. Barnes when 
shown still images from the security video.3 (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.15-21.) In addition to 
Mr. Keenworthy apparently had difficulty identifying which of the video stills he was 
shown by police officers. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, L.15 - p.215, L.3.) However, Detective 
Chopko testified that Mr. Keenworthy was shown State's exhibits four and five when 
7 
the remarks about his identification, Mr. Keenworthy also testified that he told officers, "I 
bet he did it," when asked about Mr. Barnes and the robbery, and that he called 
Mr. Barnes a clown. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.1-5.) The State elicited this testimony directly; 
however, no objection was raised by Mr. Barnes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.1-5.) 
In addition to these two witnesses, the State presented the testimony of 
Detective Ray Chopko, who interrogated Mr. Barnes regarding the theft. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.181, L.10 - p.187, L.23.) This interrogation occurred one month after the theft, 
and a picture of Mr. Barnes was taken at that time. (Vol.1 Tr., p.190, Ls.11-18.) This 
photograph was admitted into evidence and published to the jury. (Vol.1 Tr., p.190, 
Ls.20-24.) The detective admitted that he had made no investigation into Mr. Barnes' 
financial affairs at the time of the theft, nor did the detective attempt to obtain a search 
warrant to see whether items of clothing depicted on the security video were in 
Mr. Barnes' possession. (Vol.1 Tr., p.196, L.6 - p.197, L. 1 .) 
Mr. Barnes presented one witness in his defense. (Vol.1 Tr., p.240, L.8 - p.244, 
L.24.) This witness testified that Mr. Barnes and S.K. were with him for most of the 
early morning hours on the day that the theft occurred, and accounted for Mr. Barnes' 
whereabouts until approximately 3:45 or 4:00 a.m. that morning. (Vol.1 Tr., p.240, L.19 
- p.241, L.19.) The time stamp on the su~eillance video indicates that the theft took 
place at approximately 5:30 that morning. (See, e.g., State's Exhibit 2.) The alibi 
Mr. Keenworthy made the identification of Mr. Barnes. (Vol.1 Tr., p.218, L.19 - p.219, 
L.3.) 
witness also informed the jury that Mr. Barnes' vehicle had two flat tires and was not 
operational at the time of the theft. (Vol.1 Tr., p.241, L.20 - p.242, L.8.) 
During closing arguments, the State again brought the jury's attention to the 
identifications made by several witnesses of Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted on 
the security video. The State began by pointing out that the jury could easily identify 
Mr. Barnes as the person captured on the video for themselves. (Vol.1 Tr., p.263, 
Ls.13-18.) The State argued, "... we all saw the video. We saw it. We saw his face 
and we see him here today and we see the picture of what he looked like back then. 
And it is clear that that's him." (Vol.1 Tr., p.263, Ls.16-19.) 
However, the State continued: 
And we don't have to take our own eyes or our own thoughts for that. We 
have other proof. We have three independent people who worked with 
[S.K.] and saw the defendant come in multiple times. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.263, Ls.19-23.) 
The State then recounted the testimony of Mr. Cowie, Ms. Clausen, Ms. Orand, 
and Mr. Keenworthy regarding their statements identifying Mr. Barnes as the individual 
on the security video. (Vol.1 Tr., p.263, L.24 - p.266, L.17.) And the State reiterated in 
rebuttal closing argument its emphasis on the witness identifications. (Vol.1 Tr., p.282, 
L.20 - p.283, L.14.) 
Mr. Barnes was found guilty of burglary and petit theft. (R., pp.43-44.) He was 
sentenced to six years, with two years fixed for his conviction of burglary; and to 120 
days for his conviction of petit theft. (Vo1.2 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-7; R., pp.54-56.) The district 
court ordered these sentences to run concurrently and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. 
(Vo1.2 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-7; R., pp.54-56.) Prior to the expiration of the district court's period 
of retained jurisdiction, the court relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Barnes' 
I sentences4 (VoI.1 Tr., p.304, Ls.4-16; R., pp.74-76.) 
Mr. Barnes thereafter filed an ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) 
I 
motion for a reduction of sentence. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, 
ICR 35, ~ugment.') The district court denied this motion without a hearing 
(Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Rule 35 Motion, Augment.) Mr. Barnes timely 
appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., pp.47-49, 
I 
54-56 ) 
Because the district court gave Mr. Barnes credit for time served while on his rider, 
Mr. Barnes has currently served the entire balance of his sentence for petit theft. (VoI.1 
Tr., p.304, Ls.12-16; R., p.76.) 
Mr. Barnes has sought to augment the record on appeal with his motion for a 
reduction of sentence pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 35, affidavits filed in support of 
this motion, and the district court's memorandum decision and order denying this motion 
through a motion to augment the record filed concurrently with his Appellant's Brief. 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted lay testimony 
expressing an opinion as to the identity of an individual who was captured on a 
videotape that was provided to the jury? 
2. Did the district court err when it permitted the State to introduce a witness' prior 
out-of-court statements offered for proof of the matter asserted despite an 
objection that this testimony constituted hearsay? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he asked a witness about the 
witness' prior statements expressing an opinion regarding Mr. Barnes' guilt or 
innocence and further asked the witness about prior statements expressing an 
opinion regarding Mr. Barnes' character? 
4. Did the cumulative effect of these errors deprive Mr. Barnes of a fair trial? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Lav Testimony express in^ An 
Opinion As To The ldentitv Of An Individual Who Was Captured On A Videotape That 
Was Provided To The Jurv And This Testimonv Was Needlesslv Cumulative 
A. Introduction 
I 
As an issue of first impression in Idaho, Mr. Barnes asserts that the admission of 
lay opinion testimony by witnesses who did not observe the actual commission of the 
crime, and who made the identification based on identical videotape or photographic 
evidence as has been presented to the jury, improperly invades upon the function and 
I '  province of the jury as the fact-finder. Over Mr. Barnes' repeated objections, the district 
court admitted just such testimony from several witnesses, and failed to exclude the 
I 
I identification testimony of subsequent witnesses after Mr. Barnes correctly asserted that ' this testimony was merely cumulative. The district court erred when it permitted this 
testimony to be presented to the jury. Moreover, this error was compounded when the 
I I 
prosecution actually encouraged the jury to defer to the opinions of the witnesses as to 
I 
the identity of the person on the security video, rather than relying on their own 
assessments of the evidence. 
I 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Lay Testimony 
i Purportina To Identify The Person Depicted On The Securitv Video Because This 
Testimony lmproperlv Invaded The Province Of The Jurv 
1 i "The identification of the accused is an issue of fact for the jury, and may be 
I proved by direct or circumstantial evidence." State v, Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 320, 859 
I 
P.2d 353, 356 (Ct. App. 'l993). Regarding videotape evidence taken of an alleged 
perpetrator, it is "for the jury to determine if the image of the person captured on the 
tape resembled the defendant seated in the courtroom." Id. at 321, 859 P.2d at 357. In 
the context of expert testimony, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that permitting an 
expert witness to testify as to his or her opinion of the identity of the perpetrator "is more 
of an invasion of the jury's function than an 'assist' to the trier of fact." Sfate v. Hester, 
114 ldaho 688, 695, 760 P.2d 27, 34 (1988). The Court in Hesfer noted, "expert opinion 
testimony regarding Hester's identity as the abuser only served to impermissibly 
evaluate the circumstances and render the same conclusion the jury was asked to 
render by its verdict." Id at 696, 160 P.2d at 36. 
As with expert opinion testimony, lay opinion testimony is only admissible insofar 
as it would assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue. I.R.E. 701. Here, the 
jury had the same opportunity to view the evidence and draw their conclusions 
regarding whether Mr. Barnes was the person in the video as did any of the witnesses 
presented by the State. As such, the identification testimony regarding the person 
captured on the security video and still images from that video did not provide any 
information that would otherwise assist the trier of fact. Because the security video, 
stills from the security video, and a photograph that showed Mr. Barnes' appearance at 
the time of the theft were all provided to the jury, the witnesses identifying the defendant 
were merely perceiving what the jury was capable of perceiving for themselves. (See 
State's Exhibits 1-1 1 .) Therefore, the lay opinion testimony of these witnesses should 
not have been admitted into evidence. 
This conclusion is in accord with numerous other jurisdictions that have 
confronted the issue of witness identifications of persons captured on surveillance 
videotape. Many courts have held that witness testimony identifying a person on 
videotape surveillance as the defendant is only admissible in those cases where the 
witness is in a demonstrably better position than the jury to evaluate the videotape 
evidence, such as when the person making the identification is familiar with the 
defendant at the time the videotape was created and testifies to particular identifying 
features or can inform the jury of significant changes to the defendant's appearance that 
the jury would not otherwise be aware of. See, e.g., U.S. v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 
1179 (9" Cir. 1986) (identification testimony proper from witnesses who are able to 
make identification based on familiarity with characteristics of the defendant not 
immediately observable by the jury at trial); Sanders v. U.S., 809 A.2 584, 593-595 
(D.C.); Early v. State, 543 So.2d 868, 868-869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (testimony 
proper where witness testified that he knew defendant for 10 years; defendant's 
appearance was obscured by a hat and sunglasses; defendant had short hair in 
surveillance video and long hair at trial; and defendant wore beard in video and was 
clean-shaven at trial); Dawson v. Sfafe, 658 S.E.2d 755, 760-761 (Ga. 2008); 
Commonwealth v. DeLong, 888 N.E.2d 956, 962 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (defense 
counsel should have objected to witness identification because the question of whether 
the photographs were of the defendant was for the jury, not for a conclusion by a 
witness); Rossana V. State, 934 P.2d 1045, 1048-1 049 (Nev. 1997) (identifying witness 
testified that defendant had lost approximately 30 pounds, had shorter hair, and had 
begun to wear glasses at the time of trial); but see U.S. v. Contreras, 536 F.3d 1167, 
1170-1 171 (10" Cir. 2008) (while familiarity with the defendant is required for admission 
of witness' identification, change in appearance is not strictly required). This is because 
it is improper to allow a witness to testify as to the identity of a person in a video where 
such opinion evidence clearly goes to a fact which average jurors could decide while 
thinking for themselves and drawing their own conclusions. See Carter v. State, 598 
S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
This Court should now adopt the reasoning of these courts and hold that, in order 
for lay opinion testimony as to the identity of a person captured on surveillance video to 
be admissible, the State must establish the witness' personal familiarity with the 
defendant at the time of the alleged offense coupled with the particular identifying 
features or changes in appearance of the defendant that the jury would not be capable 
of perceiving on their own from a review of the videotape evidence. 
In Dawson, the defendant objected to a witness identification of the defendant as 
the individual whose image was captured on a hotel security video and still images 
taken from that video. Dawson, 658 S.E.2d at 760. The witness who identified the 
defendant from the videotape testified that he had known the defendant for 22 years; 
was a good friend of the defendant; and recognized the movement, body language, and 
mannerisms that were peculiar to the defendant. Id. The specific body language and 
mannerisms identified by the witness as peculiar to the defendant included the 
defendant's profile, hand gestures, posture, and demeanor. Id. This witness also 
testified that the defendant's appearance had changed in the four years that passed 
between the time the videotape was made and the time of trial. Id. Specifically, the 
witness testified that the defendant gained fifty pounds. Id. In light of the witness' close 
relationship with the defendant for more than two decades, and because of the specific 
changes in appearance testified to by the witness, the Supreme Court of Georgia held 
that this identification testimony was permissible. Id. at 761. Subsequent opinions have 
interpreted Dawson to require both familiarity with the defendant and subsequent 
changes to the defendant's appearance that would make the witness more likely than 
the jury to correctly identify the defendant. See Grimes v. State, 662 S.E.2d 346, 352- 
353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
Similarly, in Sanders, the witnesses at issue knew the defendant for an extended 
period of time, provided the jury with testimony as to the personal nature and length of 
the relationship, and the witnesses noted the specific physical characteristics of the 
defendant and other factors that they relied for identification. 809 A.2d at 593-594. As 
such, the Sanders Court concluded that the trial court properly permitted the witnesses 
to make identifications of the defendant based upon the witnesses' observation of 
surveillance video and stills from that video. Id. at 596-597. 
Here, in contrast, there has been no showing that most of the identifying 
witnesses had such a personal familiarity with Mr. Barnes as to give rise to a 
heightened ability to identify his features or mannerisms than that possessed by the 
jury. In fact, half of the witnesses had so little familiarity with Mr. Barnes that they did 
not even know his name. (Vol.1 Tr., p.115, Ls.1-4; p.127, Ls.12-18.) As was noted by 
Mr. Barnes' trial counsel, by the conclusion of the trial, the jury would likely have as 
much familiarity and exposure to Mr. Barnes as almost all of the State's witnesses who 
made identifications from the videotape and stills. (Vol.1 Tr., p.153, Ls.12-18.) 
Only one witness testified as to personal observation that Mr. Barnes made any 
change at all in his appearance. (Vol.1 Tr., p.121, L.8 - p.128, L.7.) The one witness 
who did assert a vague physical change was Ms. Orand, who stated, "Looks like he has 
lost weight. He has a different haircut." (Vol.1 Tr., p.128, Ls.1-2.) However, even this 
negligible statement did not provide the jury with any additional information that would 
assist the jury in determining whether it was Mr. Barnes depicted on the security video 
or the still images lifted therefrom. 
As an initial matter, stating that Mr. Barnes' haircut was "different" from the time 
when the crime occurred literally provides the jury with no guidance as to whether it is 
more likely or less likely that he was the individual on the tape. Ms. Orand's testimony 
didn't explain whether Mr. Barnes' hair was longer or shorter, lighter or darker, or 
otherwise clarify how it is that Mr. Barnes' current appearance had been altered. 
Therefore, Ms. Orand did not provide any information in this statement that would assist 
the jury as to the ultimate issue of identification. 
Likewise, her statement that Mr. Barnes "lost weight" between the time that he 
visited Subway and trial provides nearly no guidance at all. This testimony did not 
clarify whether the weight loss was significant or whether it was a subtle change with 
little impact on Mr. Barnes' outward appearance. 
But, more significant, the jury was actually provided with a photograph of 
Mr. Barnes' appearance at the time that the robbery was alleged to have occurred. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.190, L . l l  - p.191, L.5, p.263, Ls.17-18; State's Exhibit 11.) In closing 
arguments, the State specifically told the jury that this photograph was a "picture of what 
[Mr. Barnes] looked like back then." (Vol.1 Tr., p.263, Ls.17-18.) Even assuming, 
arguendo, that Ms. Orand provided information that might otherwise have assisted the 
jury in evaluating whether Mr. Barnes was the individual on the security video, this 
information was no longer inaccessible to the jury once the State introduced 
photographic evidence of Mr. Barnes appearance at the time of the theft. See Grimes, 
662 S.E.2d at 591-592. 
Further, this evidence, in addition to invading the province of the jury, was largely 
cumulative. Evidence may be excluded where its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by concerns for the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. I.R.E. 
403. As noted by trial counsel's objection, the identification testimony was nothing more 
than repetitious assertions of the opinions of witnesses that they believed Mr. Barnes 
was the individual on the videotape. (Vol.1 Tr., p.159, Ls.17-24.) Almost all of the 
identification testimony provided the jury with no specific information as to features or 
characteristics of Mr. Barnes that formed the basis for the witness' identification beyond 
information that the jury could observe for themselves. This testimony had virtually no 
probative value and should have been stricken, at least in part, by the district court as 
needlessly cumulative. 
Finally, the error in admitting this testimony was not harmless, because the 
prosecutor actually encouraged the jury in closing arguments to defer to the witnesses' 
assessment of whether Mr. Barnes was the individual depicted, rather than exercising 
their own independent judgment in the matter. 
The prosecutor began by making clear that the jury could easily identify 
Mr. Barnes as the person on the security tapes based on that evidence alone. The 
prosecutor stated: 
... we all saw the video. We saw it. We saw his face and we see him 
here today and we see the picture of what he looked like back then. And 
its clear that that's him. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.263, Ls.16-$9.) 
Although asserting that the jury could easily make the identification of Mr. Barnes 
on their own from the evidence, the prosecutor then discouraged the jury from doing so. 
The prosecutor proceeded to state: 
And we don't have to take our own eyes or thoughts for that. We have 
other proof. We have three independent people who worked with [S.K.] 
and saw the defendant come in multiple times. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.263, Ls.19-23.) 
The State then proceeded at length to reiterate the identification testimony 
presented at trial. (Vo1.l Tr., p.263, L.24 - 266, L.17.) While a jury may otherwise be 
able to make an independent assessment of the identity of a person on surveillance 
video, there were two things in this case that interfered with their proper role in 
evaluating the evidence. First, they were exposed to repeated assertions that 
Mr. Barnes was the person in the video through the guise of lay opinion testimony, and 
this almost certainly would tend to sway the jury's mind regarding whether Mr. Barnes 
was the person depicted on the tape and still images. Second, and more importantly, 
they were affirmatively called upon by the State to place credence in those 
assessments rather than their own. Because of this, it is unclear whether the jury 
ultimately determined that Mr. Barnes perpetrated the theft in this case because of the 
jury's independent evaluation of the evidence, or instead simply deferred to the opinions 
of the other witnesses as to this dispositive issue regarding Mr. Barnes' guilt or 
innocence. As such, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury's 
verdict would not have changed had the improper witness identification testimony been 
properly excluded at trial. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State To Introduce A Witness' Prior Out- 
Of-Court Statements Offered For Proof Of The Matter Asserted Despite An Obiection 
That This Testimony Constituted Hearsay 
A. Introduction 
The district court in this case erroneously determined that a witness' prior out-of- 
court statements to police were not hearsay and permitted that witness to testify at 
some length about those prior statements. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 makes clear 
that any statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, cannot 
be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in those statements. 
Because the witness' prior out-of-court statements were offered for proof of the matter 
asserted, and because none of the provisions of I.R.E. 801(d)(l) apply to these 
statements, the district court erred when it permitted the State to introduce this 
evidence. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State To lntroduce A Witness' 
Prior Out-Of-Court Statements Offered For Proof Of The Matter Asserted Despite 
An Obiection That This Testimony Constituted Hearsav 
During Mr. Barnes' trial, the State introduced evidence, over Mr. Barnes' 
objection on grounds of hearsay, of several out-of-court statements that Mr. Keenworthy 
allegedly made to police officers when the officers questioned him about Mr. Barnes. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.210, L.16 - p.213, L.21.) The district court overruled Mr. Barnes' objection, 
concluding that this testimony was not hearsay. (Vol.1 Tr., p.211, Ls.13-19.) The 
district court misapplied the applicable legal standards governing what constitutes 
hearsay when it so ruled 
This Court generally reviews the district court's determination of whether to admit 
or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 
135 ldaho 727, 731-732, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001). However, a district court abuses its 
discretion if, in exercising that discretion, the district court fails to act in conformance 
with the applicable legal standards attendant to that determination. See, e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 145 ldaho 970,979,188 P.3d 912,921 (2008). 
ldaho Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay, as well as out-of-court statements 
that do not constitute hearsay. I.R.E. 801. "Hearsay" is defined as "a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered into evidence 
in order to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c) (emphasis added). 
Under the plain language of this rule, any statement not made while testifying at trial, 
even if the person who made the statement later testifies, cannot be admitted in order to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Cf. Howard, 135 ldaho at 732, 24 P.3d at 49 
(prior consistent statement of witness admissible because was not offered for proof of 
the matter asserted and was further permitted under 801(d)(l)(B)). 
Beyond the plain language of I.R.E. 801(c), this same rule provides that prior 
statements by a witness are considered non-hearsay only under specific, enumerated 
circumstances. R E  801(d)(l) These circumstances include where the statement: (1) 
is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony at trial, permitting the out-of-court 
statement to be offered as impeachment; (2) is consistent with the declarant's testimony 
at trial and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of fabrication, improper 
influence, or motive; or (3) where the statement is one of identification of a person after 
perceiving fhe person. 
Here, it is clear that Mr. Keenworthy's statements to law enforcement officers 
were being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The questions asked about 
Mr. Keenworthy's past statements covered information such as the fact that 
Mr. Keenworthy knew Mr. Barnes and had allowed Mr. Barnes to live with him for a 
time; that Mr. Keenworthy had expressed to police that he would be able to identify 
Mr. Barnes if shown the videotape still images; that Mr. Keenworthy expressed opinions 
to police about Mr. Barnes' reputation, including that he was "a clown"; that 
Mr. Keenworthy believed the security video stills depicted Mr. Barnes; and that 
Mr. Keenworthy had told police that he believed Mr. Barnes committed the theft. (Vo1.l 
Tr., p.211, L.5 - p.213, L.21.) Each of these statements was being offered in order to 
show proof of the matters asserted by Mr. Keenworthy to the police. As such, these 
statements constituted hearsay and should have been excluded by the district court 
upon Mr. Barnes' objection. 
Moreover, none of the enumerated provisions of I.R.E. 801(d)(l) apply in this 
case that would otherwise render Mr. Keenworthy's testimony non-hearsay. These out- 
of-court statements were not offered as impeachment evidence for inconsistent 
testimony at trial, nor were they offered to demonstrate Mr. Keenworthy's credibility in 
the face of any charge of fabrication, or improper influence or motive. See I.R.E. 
801(d)(l)(A), (B). (Vol.1 Tr., p.209, L.7 - p.217, L.13.) 
The provisions of I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(C) also do not apply because Mr. Keenworthy 
was not observing Mr. Barnes' person at the time. As an initial matter, the out-of-court 
statements testified to by Mr. Keenworthy encompassed a great deal of matters beyond 
the issue of identification of the person on the video still images. (Vol.1 Tr., p.211, L.5 - 
p.213, L.21.) However, even Mr. Keenworthy's expression of opinion about the identity 
of the person on the videotape does not fall within the provisions of this rule. 
Mr. Keenworthy was shown a photograph, which was apparently a still image of 
a videotape. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.15-19.) Whether Mr. Keenworthy might have 
believed that this image captured a person he knew is irrelevant, because the statement 
at issue involved perception of an image and not a person, as is the standard of I.R.E. 
801(d)(l)(C). As such, Mr. Keenworthy's testimony regarding his statements to police 
identifying Mr. Barnes on an earlier occasion did not fall within the purview of I.R.E. 
801(d)(l)(C), and therefore constituted impermissible hearsay when offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted. A person making an identification of an individual in a picture or 
video is entirely different than an eyewitness identification by one who has witnessed 
the commission of the actual crime. The witness in the latter situation has, in fact, seen 
the person who committed the offense and, unlike the jurors at trial, has additional 
information to assist the jury by virtue of witnessing the crime itself. Mr. Keenworthy 
never saw the person in the act of committing the theft at Subway, and therefore does 
not come within the non-hearsay provision of I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(C). 
This testimony was also not harmless. As has been noted, Mr. Keenworthy's 
statements purporting to identify Mr. Barnes were part of a greater pattern that 
encouraged jurors to defer to the determinations of witnesses regarding evidence that 
was properly within the province of the jury to evaluate. See argument I supra. 
Additionally, Mr. Keenworthy's statements to police regarding his opinion of Mr. Barnes' 
character and guilt were inflammatory and tended to induce the passions and prejudice 
of the jury. See argument Ill infra. Mr. Keenworthy's testimony regarding his remarks 
to police about being able to identify Mr. Barnes, if he was the person captured on the 
video, also tended to improperly bolster Mr. Keenworthy's own testimony, essentially 
conveying through this hearsay that Mr. Keenworthy was in a better position than the 
jurors to determine the issue of identity in this case. 
In sum, Mr. Keenworthy's testimony as to his out-of-court statements to police 
officers was placed into evidence in order to show the truth of the matter asserted. 
None of the non-hearsay provisions for out-of-court statements by a witness at trial 
apply in this case. As such, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
Mr. Keenworthy's prior out-of-court statements to police. And this erroneous admission 
of this evidence was not harmless given the substance of the statements that 
Mr. Keenworthy testified to. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Asked A Witness About The Witness' 
Prior Statements Expressinp An Opinion Regardinq Mr. Barnes' Guilt Or Innocence And 
Further Asked The Witness About Prior Statements Expressina An Ooinion Regarding 
Mr. Barnes' Character 
A. Introduction 
The State, during its direct examination of Mr. Keenworthy, improperly and 
intentionally elicited testimony regarding Mr. Keenworthy's opinion that Mr. Barnes was 
guilty, and that Mr. Keenworthy thought Mr. Barnes was "a clown." (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, 
Ls.1-5.) This misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error, and operated to 
deprive Mr. Barnes of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Mr. Barnes did not object to the prosecutor's remarks alleged to be improper in 
this appeal. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.1-5.) But ~ r .  Barnes asserts that the prosecutor's 
misconduct in examining Mr. Keenworthy was so egregious as to rise to the level of 
fundamental error that is reviewable for the first time on appeal, and that these acts of 
misconduct were not harmless. 
Where the defendant fails to make an objection at trial, a conviction will be 
reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as 
to result in fundamental error. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477, 480 
(Ct. App. 2008). "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error 
when it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse prejudice or passion 
against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be induced to determine 
guilt on factors outside the evidence." Id. However, a conviction will not be overturned, 
even in cases where misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error, if this Court 
finds that the error was harmless. Id. An error is harmless if this Court can conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not have been different in 
absence of the misconduct. Id. 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When The Prosecutor Asked 
Mr. Keenworthy About His Prior Statements Expressinq An Opinion On 
Mr. Barnes' Guilt Or Innocence 
During the course of direct examination of Mr. Keenworthy, the prosecutor asked, 
"Did you say, and I quote, 'I bet he did it?"' (VoI.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Keenworthy 
responded that it was very possible that he did. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, L.3.) 
As previously noted, this testimony was improper because it constituted 
impermissible hearsay. See argument ll supra. However, the prosecutor's deliberate 
elicitation and prompting of this testimony is also improper because it constitutes 
misconduct in the form of calling upon a witness to make a determination of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, which is a complete usurpation of the province of the 
jury. State V.  Walters, 120 ldaho 46, 53-54, 813 P.2d 857, 864-865 (1990). 
As an initial matter, Mr. Barnes did not object to this question and its answer 
beyond his objection to its content as hearsay. (Vol.1 Tr., p.211, Ls.13-17, p.213, Ls.1- 
3.) However, the ldaho Supreme Court has already determined that errors of this sort 
constitute fundamental errors that can be raised on appeal despite a lack of objection 
below. Walters, 120 ldaho at 53-54, 813 P.2d at 864-865. 
In Walters, the prosecutor elicited testimony from one of the State's witnesses, 
an arson investigator, that the investigator believed the defendant was the person who 
started the fire that was determined to be arson. Walters, 120 ldaho at 47, 813 P.2d at 
858. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's questions when they were asked, 
and further did not request that the responses be stricken. Id. After a lengthy 
discussion regarding the standard of fundamental error, the ldaho Supreme Court held 
that this testimony constituted fundamental error. Id. at 53-54. In doing so, the Walters 
court held that, "[tlhis invasion of the jury function, instigated by the prosecutor and 
countenanced by the trial court, clearly foreclosed Mr. Walters' fundamental right to a 
fair trial." Id. at 54. 
Here, as in Walters, the prosecutor deliberately elicited testimony from a witness 
as to whether that witness believed that the defendant was guilty. This is the 
paramount issue for the jury at trial, and is exclusively within the province of the jury to 
determine. As such, this is not only misconduct, but it is misconduct that rises to the 
level of a fundamental error. See Walfers. 120 Idaho at 53-54. 
Moreover, this error was not harmless. The prosecutor attempted to portray 
Mr. Keenworthy as an individual who was familiar with Mr. Barnes, and even noted that 
Mr. Barnes lived with Mr. Keenworthy and S.K. for a substantial period of time. (Vol.1 
Tr., p.209, L.20 - p.212, L.25.) In doing so, the prosecutor was seeking to establish that 
Mr. Keenworthy had personal knowledge of Mr. Barnes' character that would support 
his conclusion that Mr. Barnes "did it." The prosecutor also characterized 
Mr. Keenworthy during closing arguments as someone who "knew [Mr. Barnes] really 
well, too." (Vol.1 Tr., p.265, L.9) 
This line of argument calls upon the jury to base its decision on factors outside 
the evidence, and likewise constitutes an appeal to the passion and prejudice of the 
jury. Because Mr. Keenworthy was portrayed as someone familiar with Mr. Barnes and 
his character, the jury was quite likely to give credence to the assessment of 
Mr. Keenworthy as to Mr. Barnes' guilt or innocence, rather than basing their decision 
on the relevant, admissible evidence presented at trial. 
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When The Prosecutor Asked 
Mr. Keenworthv About His Prior Statements Expressinq An Opinion On 
Mr. Barnes' Character 
Immediately following the above noted exchange, the prosecutor also asked 
Mr. Keenworthy whether he called Mr. Barnes "a clown" when questioned by police. 
(Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.4-5.) Mr. Keenworthy indicated that he had. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, 
Ls.4-5.) 
With certain limited exceptions, evidence of the defendant's character is not 
admissible at trial in order to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. 
I.R.E. 404(a). As has been noted, it is also prosecutorial misconduct to appeal to the 
passions and prejudice of the jury. Gross, 146 ldaho at 18, 189 P.3d at 480. 
Inflammatory words employed in describing the defendant are clearly improper and 
constitute misconduct. See State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507-508, 988 P.2d 1170, 
1181-1182 (1999); State v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710, 716, 85 P.3d 1109, 11 15 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
While name-calling by the prosecutor does not always rise to the level of 
fundamental error, this particular instance of prosecutorial misconduct followed exactly 
on the heels of the earlier mentioned misconduct wherein the prosecutor elicited an 
opinion regarding Mr. Barnes' guilt. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, this Court 
can consider whether several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, in the aggregate, 
"show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due 
process." Gross, 146 ldaho at 21, 189 P.3d at 483. 
In this case, the prosecutor followed a question eliciting an opinion on the 
defendant's guilt with a question that can only be interpreted as intended to 
demonstrate the defendant's bad character. (Vol.1 Tr., p.213, Ls.1-5.) These remarks, 
in conjunction, were clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse 
prejudice or passion against Mr. Barnes, and further were so inflammatory that the 
jurors likely induced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence. As previously 
noted, Mr. Keenworthy was portrayed as a man who knew Mr. Barnes' character. As 
such, the jury was far more likely to give credence to Mr. Keenworthy's assessment that 
Mr. Barnes was, essentially, a bad guy. In light of the inflammatory and deliberate 
nature of this misconduct, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury 
would have reached the same result absent the misconduct in this case. 
Under The Cumulative Error Doctrine, The Cumulative Effect Of These Errors Deprived 
Mr. Barnes Of His Due Process Rinhts To A Fair Trial 
A. Introduction 
The several errors that occurred in this case, even if deemed harmless when 
viewed in isolation, cumulatively deprived Mr. Barnes of his right to a fair trial. Almost 
all of these errors when to the issue of the identity of the person who committed the 
theft, which was the determinative issue as to whether Mr. Barnes was guilty of these 
offenses. 
B. Under The Cumulative Error Doctrine, The Cumulative Effect Of These Errors 
Deprived Mr. Barnes Of His Due Process Riqhts To A Fair Trial 
Mr. Barnes asserts that, even if the errors occurring at trial are deemed harmless 
when viewed in isolation, taken in the aggregate, these errors deprived him his 
constitutional right to a fair trial. 
"The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of 
which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show an absence of a fair trial 
in contravention of a defendant's constitutional right to due process." Dunlap v. State, 
141 ldaho 50, 65-66, 106 P.3d 376, 391-392 (2004) (quoting Sfafe v. Sheahan, 139 
ldaho 267,286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003)). 
In this case, the district court improperly allowed no less than four witnesses to 
give improper testimony regarding the identity of the person captured on the security 
video. Not only did the district court allow in testimony that invaded the province of the 
jury, but the jury was specifically encouraged by the prosecutor to rely on these 
witnesses' assessments rather than on the jury's own view of the evidence. The district 
court further allowed improper hearsay evidence through Mr. Keenwoithy's testimony. 
This testimony subsumed both improper identification evidence, and the prosecutor's 
improper elicitation of past statements that Mr. Keenworthy thought the defendant "did 
it," and was "a clown." 
Almost ail of these errors involve the same issue that the jury was called upon to 
determine - the identity of the person who committed the theft. This was also the 
paramount and determinative issue in this case. 
In absence of all of these errors, had the jury been left to its own devices to 
evaluate the videotape evidence and been allowed to act without the taint of improper 
testimony as to Mr. Barnes' character and the opinion of witnesses as to his guilt, it 
cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same 
verdict. Moreover, Mr. Barnes presented credible alibi evidence as to his whereabouts 
on the evening of the theft, as well as evidence that he lacked a means of transportation 
that would enable him to arrive at and escape from the Subway that evening. (Vo1.l 
Tr., p.240, L.8 - p.242, L.13.) This is not a case where, limiting the State's proof to the 
proper evidence that was submitted to the jury, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury's verdict would have been the same. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
I Mr. Barnes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
I 
judgment of conviction and sentence in this case and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
I 
I DATED this 25th day of September, 2008. 
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